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Abstract. We propose TOPL automata as a new method for runtime verification
of systems with unbounded resource generation. Paradigmatic such systems are
object-oriented programs which can dynamically generate an unbounded num-
ber of fresh object identities during their execution. Our formalism is based on
register automata, a particularly successful approach in automata over infinite
alphabets which administers a finite-state machine with boundedly many input-
storing registers. We show that TOPL automata are equally expressive to register
automata and yet suitable to express properties of programs. Compared to other
runtime verification methods, our technique can handle a class of properties be-
yond the reach of current tools. We show in particular that properties which re-
quire value updates are not expressible with current techniques yet are naturally
captured by TOPL machines. On the practical side, we present a tool for runtime
verification of Java programs via TOPL properties, where the trade-off between
the coverage and the overhead of the monitoring system is tunable by means of a
number of parameters. We validate our technique by checking properties involv-
ing multiple objects and chaining of values on large open source projects.
1 Introduction
Runtime verification [19,22] connotes the monitoring of program executions in order to
detect specific error traces which correspond to violations of sought safety properties.
In contrast to its static counterpart, runtime verification checks only certain program
executions, yet the error reports are accurate as detected violations represent real bugs
in the program. In the case of systems with dynamic generation of resources, such as
object references in Java, runtime verification faces the key challenge of reasoning about
a potentially unbounded number of parameter values representing resource identities.
Hence, the techniques applicable in this realm of programs must be able to deal with
infinite alphabets (this idiom is also known as parametric monitoring). Leading runtime
verification techniques tackle the issue using different approaches, such as reducing the
problem to checking projections of execution traces over bounded sets of data values
(trace slicing) [26,20,3,2], or employing abstract machines whose transition rules are
explicitly parameterised [9,7,8].
Another community particularly interested in reasoning over similar data domains,
albeit motivated by XML reasoning and model-checking, is the one working on au-
tomata over infinite alphabets. Their research has been prolific in developing a wide
range of paradigms and accompanying logics, with varying degrees of expressivity and
effectiveness (see [27] for an overview from 2006). A highly successful such paradigm
is that of Register Automata [21,24], which are finite-state machines equipped with a
fixed number of registers where input values can be stored, updated and compared with
subsequent inputs. They provide a powerful device for reasoning about temporal rela-
tions between a possibly unbounded number of objects in a finite manner. In this work
we propose a foundational runtime verification method based on a novel class of ma-
chines called TOPL automata, which connects the field with the literature on automata
over infinite alphabets and, more specifically, with register automata.
The key features of our machines are: (1) the use of registers, and (2) the use of sets
of active states (non-determinism). From the verification point of view, registers allow
us to use a fixed amount of specification variables which, however, can be re-bound
(i.e. have their values updated). On the other hand, by being able to spawn several ac-
tive states, we can select different parts of the same run to be stored and processed.
These features give us the expressive power to capture a wide range of realistic pro-
gram properties in a finite way. A specific such class of properties concerns chaining
or propagation, which are of focal importance in areas like dynamic taint analysis [25]
as well as dynamic shape analysis.1 In the latter case, we aspire to reason at runtime
about particular shapes of dynamically allocated data-structures irrespectively of their
size. For example, checking
“the shape of the list should not contain cycles” (1)
for lists of any size and in a finite way, requires two activities. First, being able to change
the value of the variables in the specification while traversing the list (re-binding). Sec-
ond, keeping correlations of different elements in the list at the same time (multiple
active states).
TOPL Properties
hl-TOPL Automata
TOPL Automata
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the main con-
cepts. The target of each arrow is
at least as expressive as its source.
The aim of this work is to exploit the flexibility
and the power of registers to address certain proper-
ties not expressible with other approaches while, on
the other hand, making it easy for programmers to ex-
press properties of their code. More precisely, we start
from register automata and extend them driven by typ-
ical properties required in real-world object-oriented
systems. This process results in the definition of two
new classes of automata:
– TOPL automata, which are low-level and are used
for simplifying the formal correspondence with
register automata;
– hl-TOPL automata, which are high-level and natu-
rally express temporal properties about programs.
We moreover define the Temporal Object Property Language (TOPL), a formal lan-
guage which maps directly onto hl-TOPL automata and is used for expressing runtime
specifications. TOPL is a Java-programmer-friendly language where properties look
like small Java programs that violate the desired program behaviour. The hierarchy of
presented concepts is depicted in Figure 1.
1 Although shape analysis is mainly a static technique, we will see in Section 2 that, when doing
run-time monitoring, being able to reason about shapes may be vital.
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We complement and validate our theoretical results with a practical runtime veri-
fication tool for Java programs. The tool can be used by programmers to rigorously
express temporal properties about programs, which are then automatically checked by
the system. Although the formal correspondence to register automata is completely hid-
den from the user, it provides a concrete automata-theoretic foundation which allows
us to know formally the advantages and limitations of our technique, and also reuse
results from the register automata literature. Moreover, our tool can be tuned in terms
of coverage, overhead and trace reporting by means of a number of parameters.
Contributions. This paper builds upon [18], which introduced the language of TOPL
properties and drafted the corresponding automata. Here we clarify the latter, provide a
formal correspondence to automata over infinite alphabet, and devise and test a practical
tool implementation. In summary, the contributions of the present work are:
– We introduce TOPL and hl-TOPL automata, two classes of abstract machines for
verifying systems over infinite alphabets. We prove that both formalisms are equally
expressive to register automata by constructing formal reductions between them. The
reductions allow us to transfer results from the register automata setting to ours (e.g. de-
cidability of language emptiness, language closures, etc.).
– We define TOPL, a formal specification language designed for expressing pro-
gram properties involving object interactions over time in a way that is familiar to
object-oriented programmers. We moreover present a formal semantics for TOPL, thus
making it suitable for static and dynamic program analysis.
– We implement a tool for automatically checking for violations of TOPL proper-
ties in Java programs at runtime. A number of parameters are provided for tuning the
precision of the system. We furthermore report on experiments in which we ran our tool
on large open-source projects. The results are encouraging: for example, we have found
an interesting and previously unknown concurrency bug in the DaCapo suite [13].
2 Motivating Examples
Interaction among objects is at the core of the object-oriented paradigm. Consider for
example Java collections. A typical property one would want to state is
If one iterator modifies its collection then other iterators of the same collec-
tion become invalid, i.e. they cannot be used further. (2)
The formalisation of the above constraint is non-trivial since it needs to keep track of
several objects (at least two iterators and one collection) and their interaction over time.
A slightly more complex scenario is described in Figure 2. Class CharArray ma-
nipulates an array of chars, while class Concat concatenates two objects of type Str.
Both classes implement the Str interface. Consider the case where Concat is used for
implementing a rope.2 The operations of a rope (e.g. insert, concat, delete) may update
its shape and the references to its root. In this case we may have two or more collec-
tions sharing some elements. Hence, iterators operating on those different collections
may invalidate each other. We need to modify (2), increasing its complexity:
2 A rope is a data structure for efficiently storing and manipulating very long strings.
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interface Str {
void set(int i, char c);
char get(int i);
int len();
Itr iterator();
}
interface Itr {
boolean hasNext();
char next();
void set(char c);
}
class CharArray implements Str {
char [] data;
// ...
}
class Concat implements Str {
Str s, t;
public static Concat make(Str s, Str t) {
/* ... */
}
// ...
}
Fig. 2. A first example: Java code.
If one iterator modifies its collection then other iterators of collections shar-
ing some of its elements become invalid, i.e. they cannot be used further. (3)
On the need for re-binding. Let us now suppose we want to perform taint checking on
input coming from a web form. What we want to check is the property:
Any value introduced by the input() method should not reach the sink()
method without first passing through the sanitizer() method. (4)
Although the property may seem simple, its difficulty can vary depending on the con-
text. Consider the case where the input is constructed by concatenating strings from a
web form, for example by using ropes implemented with class Concat. The number
of user inputs, and therefore of concatenations, is not known a priori and is in general
unbounded. Consequently, we may end up having an unbounded number of tainted ob-
jects. In a temporal specification, we would then need either one logical variable for
each of them, or the ability to rebind (or update) variables in the specification so that
we can trace taint propagation. For an unbounded number of objects, rebinding spec-
ification variables with different values during the computation helps in keeping the
specification finite.
The need for rebinding of variables in the specification arises also in other contexts.
For example, when reasoning about the evolving shape of dynamically allocated data-
structures. Consider the following loop which uses a list:
while (l.next()!=null) { ... }
If the list l contains a cycle, the loop will diverge. Being a violation of a liveness
property (termination), divergence cannot be observed at runtime in finite time and
therefore it is harder to debug. If we obtained the list by calling a third-party library, we
would want to check the property (1) from the Introduction. The finite encoding of such
properties requires the ability to update the values of specification variables.
3 TOPL Automata
We start by presenting some basic definitions. We fix V to be an infinite set of values,
with its members denoted by v, u and variants. Given an arity n, a letter ℓ is an element
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(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Σ, where Σ = V n is the alphabet. For ℓ = (v1, ..., vn), we set the
notation ℓ(i) = vi. Given a size m, we define the set of stores to be S = V m. For
a store s = (u1, ..., um), we write s(i) for ui. A register i is an integer from the set
{1, ...,m} identifying a component of the store.
A guard g is a formula in a specified logic, interpreted over pairs of letters and
stores; we write (s, ℓ) |= g to denote that the store s ∈ S and the letter ℓ ∈ Σ satisfy
the guard g, and we denote the set of guards by G. An action a is a small program
which, given an input letter, performs a store update. That is, the set of actions is some
set A ⊆ Σ → S → S.
Given an alphabetΣ = V n and a (memory) size m, we shall define TOPL automata
to operate on the set of labels Λ = G×A, where G and A are given by:
G ::= eq i j | neq i j | true | G and G
A ::= nop | set i := j | A;A
with i ∈ {1, ...,m} and j ∈ {1, ..., n}. If n = 1, then (eq i) stands for (eq i 1); (neq i)
for (neq i 1); and (set i) stands for (set i := 1). The guards are evaluated as follows.
(s, ℓ) |= eq i j if s(i) = ℓ(j), (s, ℓ) |= true always,
(s, ℓ) |= neq i j if s(i) 6= ℓ(j), (s, ℓ) |= g1and g2 if (s, ℓ) |= g1 and (s, ℓ) |= g2.
The TOPL actions are built up from the empty action, nop(ℓ)(s) = s; the assignment
action, (set i := j)(ℓ)(s) = s[i 7→ ℓ(j)] (where s[i 7→ v](k) = s(k) if k 6= i, and v
otherwise); and action composition, (a1; a2)(ℓ) = a1(ℓ) ◦ a2(ℓ).
We can now define our first class of automata.
Definition 1. A TOPL automaton with m registers, operating on n-tuples, is a tuple
A = 〈Q, q0, s0, δ, F 〉 where:
– Q is a finite set of states, with initial one q0 ∈ Q and final ones F ⊆ Q;
– s0 ∈ S is an initial store;
– δ ⊆ Q× Λ×Q is a finite transition relation.
A configuration x is a pair (q, s) of a state q and a store s; we denote the set of
configurations by X = Q × S. The initial configuration is (q0, s0). A configuration is
final when its state is final. The configuration graph of a TOPL automaton A as above
is a subset of X × Σ × X . We write x1
ℓ
→A x2 to mean that (x1, ℓ, x2) is in the
configuration graph of A (we may omit the subscript if A is clear from the context).
Definition 2. Let A be a TOPL automaton. The configuration graph of A consists of
exactly those configuration transitions (q1, s1) ℓ→A (q2, s2) for which there is a TOPL-
automaton transition (q1, (g, a), q2) ∈ δ such that (s1, ℓ) |= g and a(ℓ)(s1) = s2.
The language L(A) of A is the set of words that label walks from the initial configura-
tion to some final one: L(A) = { ℓ1 . . . ℓk | x0 initial, xk final, ∀i ≤ k. xi−1 ℓi→A xi }.
A TOPL automaton is deterministic when its configuration graph contains no two dis-
tinct transitions that have the same source x1 and are labeled by the same letter ℓ, that
is, x1
ℓ
→ x2 and x1
ℓ
→ x3 with x2 6= x3.
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Example 3. Consider the language { abc ∈ V 3 | a 6= c and b 6= c }. It is recognized by
the following TOPL automaton with 2 registers over the alphabet Σ = V . The values
in the initial store s0 can be arbitrary.
– Q = {1, 2, 3, 4}, q0 = 1 and F = {4};
– δ = {(1, (true, set 1), 2)}∪{(2, (true, set 2), 3)}∪{(3, (neq 1 and neq 2, nop), 4)}.
Example 4. For a more involved example, let us consider two languages over Σ = V 2:
L = { (v1, v2)(v2, v3)(v3, v4) . . . (vm−1, vm)(vm, v1) | m > 1 ∧ ∀i. vi ∈ V }
L′ = {w′ | ∃w ∈ L. w is a subsequence of w′ }
q0
q1
q2
set 1:=1; set 2:=2
true, nop
eq 21, set 2:=2
true, nop
eq 21 and eq 12
true, nop
(We say that ℓ1 . . . ℓm is a subsequence of ℓ′1 . . . ℓ′n if there ex-
ists a strictly increasing f : [m] → [n] such that f(i) = j
only if ℓi = ℓ′j .) To account for chaining, as L requires, we
will use two registers, one for v1 and one for the second com-
ponent of the last seen letter. To account for all subsequences,
as L′ requires, we will use nondeterminism. In particular, the
state q1 has two loops, one guarded by true and another guarded
by eq 21.
Relation to Register Automata. There is a natural connection between TOPL automata
and Register Automata [21,24]. In particular, register automata are TOPL automata with
n = 1 and labels from ΛR ⊆ Λ, where
ΛR = { (fresh, set i) | i ∈ {1, ...,m} } ∪ { (eq i, nop) | i ∈ {1, ...,m} }
and fresh ≡ (neq 1 and neq 2 and · · · and neqm).3 In fact, we can show that the
restrictions above are not substantial, in the sense that TOPL automata are reducible to
register automata, and therefore equally expressive. In the following statement we use
the standard injection f : (V n)∗ → V ∗ such that f(L(A)) = { v11 . . . vn1 · · · v1k . . . vnk |
(v11 , . . . , v
n
1 ) · · · (v
1
k, . . . , v
n
k ) ∈ L(A) }.
Proposition 5 (TOPL to RA). There exists an algorithm that, given a TOPL automa-
ton A, builds a register automaton A′ such that L(A′) = f(L(A)). If A has m regis-
ters, |δ| transitions, |Q| states, and works over n-tuples, then A′ has 2m+ 1 registers,
|δ′| = O(n(2m)2m|δ|) transitions and O((2m)m|Q|+ |δ′|) states.
High-level Automata TOPL automata seem to be lacking the convenience one would
desire for verifying actual programs. In particular, when writing down a monitor for a
specific violation, one may naturally not want to specify all other possible behaviours of
the program (which may, though, be of relevance to other monitors). In fact, program
behaviours not relevant to the violation under consideration can be skipped, ignored
altogether. A possible solution for the latter could be to introduce loops with empty
guards and actions, with the hope to consume the non-relevant part of the program
3 Here a register automaton corresponds directly to what in [24] is called a 1N-RA.
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behaviour. However, such a solution would not have the desired effect: the empty loops
could also consume input relevant to the monitored violation.
The above considerations lead us to introduce a new kind of automaton where inputs
can be skipped. That is, at each configuration x of a such an automaton, if an input does
not match any of the guards of the available transitions from x the automaton will skip
that input and examine the next one. In order to accommodate cases where we want
specific transitions to happen consecutively, without skipping in between, we allow our
automata to operate on sequences of letters, rather than single ones.
Definition 6. A high-level TOPL automaton (hl-TOPL) is a tuple A = 〈Q, q0, s0, δ, F 〉
where:
– Q is a finite set Q of states, with initial one q0 ∈ Q and final ones F ⊆ Q;
– s0 ∈ S is an initial store;
– δ ⊆ Q× Λ∗ ×Q is a finite transition relation.
Although the definition of the syntax of high-level automata is very similar to that of
ordinary TOPL automata, their semantics is quite different. A high-level configuration
(hl-configuration) is a pair (x,w) of a configuration x and a word w; we denote the
set of hl-configurations by Y = X × Σ∗. We think of w as yet to be processed. A hl-
configuration is initial when its configuration is the initial configuration; that is, it has
the shape ((q0, s0), w). A hl-configuration is final when its state is final and its word
is the empty word; that is, it has the shape ((q, s), ǫ), where q ∈ F and ǫ is the empty
word. The hl-configuration graph is a subset of Y × Σ∗ × Y . We write y1
w
→֒A y2 to
mean that (y1, w, y2) is in the hl-configuration graph of A.
The following concept simplifies the definition of the hl-configuration graph. For
each store s and sequence of pairs (gi, ai) of guards and actions (i = 1, . . . , d), we
construct a TOPL automaton
T
(
s, (g1, a1), . . . , (gd, ad)
)
with set of states {0, . . . , d}, out of which 0 is initial and d is final, initial store s, and
transitions (i−1, (gi, ai), i) for each i = 1, . . . , d. Recall that, in this case, ℓ1 . . . ℓd
is accepted by the automaton when there exist configurations x0, x1, . . . , xd such that
x0 = (0, s) and xi−1
ℓi→ xi, for each i = 1, . . . , d. If the store of xd is s′ we say that
the automaton can accept ℓ1 . . . ℓd with store s′.
Definition 7. The configuration graph of a hl-TOPL automatonA consists of two types
of transitions:
– Standard transitions, of the form ((q1, s1), ww′) w→֒ ((q2, s2), w′),
when there exists (q1, λ¯, q2) ∈ δ such that T (s1; λ¯) can accept w with store s2.
– Skip transitions, of the form (x, ℓw) ℓ→֒ (x,w),
when no standard transition starts from (x, ℓw).
The languageL(A) ofA is the set of words that label paths from an initial hl-configuration
to a final one: L(A) = {w1 . . . wk | y0 initial, yk final, ∀i ≤ k. yi−1 wi→֒ yi}.
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Remark 8. Note that a TOPL automaton A can be technically seen as a high-level one
with singleton transition labels. However, its language is in general different from the
one we would get if we interpreted A as a high-level machine. For example, let A be
the TOPL automaton consisting of one transition labelled with the guard eq 1, from
the initial state to the final state. The alphabet is Σ = V and the initial store has one
register containing value v. The language of A consists of one word made of one letter,
namely v. On the other hand, because of skip transitions, the language of A seen as a
hl-TOPL automaton consists of all words that contain the letter v.
Example 9. Consider the following hl-TOPL automaton with 2 registers over the alpha-
bet Σ = V = {A,B}.
– Q = {1, 2, 3}, q0 = 1 and s0 = (A,B) and F = {3},
– δ consists of
(
1,
[
(eq 2, nop), (eq 1, nop), (eq 2, nop)
]
, 2
)
and
(
1,
[
(eq 1, nop)
]
, 3
)
.
The language of this is automaton consists of those words in which the first A is not
surrounded by two Bs.
We next present transformations between the two different classes of automata we
introduced. First, we can transform TOPL automata to high-level ones by practically
disallowing skip transitions: we obfuscate the original automaton A with extra transi-
tions to a non-accepting sink state, in such a way that no room for skip transitions is
left.
Proposition 10 (TOPL to hl-TOPL). There exists an algorithm that, given a TOPL
automatonA with |Q| states, at most d outgoing transitions from each state, and guards
with at most k conjuncts, it builds a hl-TOPL automaton A′ with |Q|+ 1 states and at
most (d+ kd)|Q| transitions such that L(A) = L(A′).
The converse is more difficult. A TOPL automaton simulates a given hl-TOPL one
by delaying decisions. Roughly, there are two modes of operation: (1) store the current
letter in registers for later use, and (2) simulate the configuration transitions of the
original automaton. The key insight is that Step 2 is entirely a static computation. To
see why, a few details about Step 1 help.
The TOPL automaton has registers to store the last few letters. The states encode
how many letters are saved in registers. The states also encode a repartition function
that records which TOPL register simulates a particular hl-TOPL register or a particular
component of a past letter. The repartition function ensures that distinct TOP registers
hold distinct values. Thus, it is possible to perform equality checks between hl-TOPL
registers and components of the saved letters using only the repartition function. Sim-
ilarly, it is possible to simulate copying a component of a saved letter into one of the
hl-TOPL registers by updating the repartition function. Because it is possible to eval-
uate guards and simulate actions statically, the run of the hl-TOPL automaton can be
completely simulated statically for the letters that are saved in registers.
Proposition 11 (hl-TOPL to TOPL). There exists an algorithm that, given a hl-TOPL
automaton A, builds a TOPL automaton A′ such that L(A) = L(A′). If A is over the
alphabet V n with m registers, |Q| states, and |δ| transitions of length ≤ d, then A′ is
over the alphabet V with m′ = m+(d− 1)n registers, O(d2(m+1)m|Q|) states, and
O(d2(m+ 1)(m+n)|δ|) transitions.
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Remark 12. Although Propositions 10 and 11 imply that hl-TOPL and TOPL automata
are equally expressive, the transformations between them are non-trivial and substan-
tially increase the size of the machines (especially in the hl-TOPL-to-TOPL direction).
This discrepancy is explained by the different goals of the two models: TOPL automata
are meant to be easy to analyse, while high-level automata are meant to be convenient
for specifying properties of object-oriented programs. The runtime monitors implement
the high-level semantics directly.
Since both TOPL and hl-TOPL automata can be reduced to register automata, using
known results for the latter [24] we obtain the following.
Theorem 13. TOPL and hl-TOPL automata share the following properties.
1. The emptiness and the membership problems are decidable.
2. The language inclusion, the language equivalence and the universality problems
are undecidable in general.
3. The languages of these automata are closed under union, intersection, concatena-
tion and Kleene star.
4. The languages of these automata are not closed under complementation.
The first point of Theorem 13 guarantees that monitoring with TOPL automata is
decidable. On the other hand, by the second point, it is not possible to automatically
validate refactorings of TOPL automata. Closure under regular operations, apart from
negation, allows us to write specifications as negation-free regular expressions. The
final point accentuates the difference between property violation and validation.
4 TOPL Properties
In this section we describe the user-level Temporal Object Property Language (TOPL),
which provides a programmer-friendly way to write down hl-TOPL automata relevant
to runtime verification. The full syntax of the language was presented in [18]. Below we
give the main ingredients and define the translation from the language to our automata.
A TOPL property comprises a sequence of transition statements, of the form
source -> target: label
where source and target are identifiers representing the states of the described automa-
ton. The sequence of statements thus represents the transition relation of the automaton.
Each property must include distinguished vertices start and error, which correspond
to the initial and (unique) final states respectively.
The set of labels has been crafted in such a way that it captures the observable
events of program executions. Observable events for TOPL properties are method calls
and returns, called event ids, along with their parameter values. The set of event ids is
given by the grammar:
E ::= call m | ret m
where m belongs to an appropriate set of method names. Each method name has an
arity, which we shall in general leave implicit. The set VL of possible parameter values
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is a set of values specified by the programming language (e.g. Java) plus a dummy value
⊥. The set of all values is V = VL ∪ E.
Labels of TOPL properties refer to registers via patterns. A register v is called a
property variable and has three associated patterns:
– the uppercase pattern V matches any value and writes it in the property variable v;
– the lowercase pattern v reads the value of the property variable v and only matches
that value; and
– the negated lowercase pattern !v reads the value of the property variable v and only
matches different values.
In addition, every element of V acts as a pattern that matches only the value it denotes,
and a wildcard (*) pattern matches any value. The set of all patterns is denoted by Pat.
A transition label can take one of the three forms:
l ::= call m(x1, . . . , xk) | ret x := m | x := m(x1, . . . , xk)
where x, x1, . . . , xk ∈ Pat. Note that the latter two forms are distinct – the last one
incorporates a call and a matching return. Finally, a TOPL property is well-formed when
it satisfies the conditions:
(i) each label must contain an uppercase value pattern at most once;
(ii) any use of a lowercase pattern (i.e. a read) must be preceded by a use of the
corresponding uppercase pattern (i.e., a write) on all paths from start.
From now on we assume TOPL properties to be well-formed.
From TOPL to automata. We now describe how a TOPL property P yields a corre-
sponding hl-TOPL automatonAP . First, if n is the maximum arity of all methods in P ,
the alphabet of AP will be:
ΣP = E × V
n+1
L
where the extra register is used for storing return values. Note that ΣP follows our previ-
ous convention of alphabets: it is a sub-alphabet of Σ = V n+2. For example, if P has a
maximal arity 5, the event call m(a, b, c) would be understood as (call m,⊥, a, b, c,⊥,⊥)
byAP . Here the first component is the event id, the second is a filler for the return value,
the next three are the parameter values and the rest are paddings which are used in order
for all tuples to have the same length. The event ret r = m would be understood as
(ret m, r,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) by AP .
We include inAP one register for each property variable in P and, in order to match
elements from V , we include an extra register for each element mentioned by P (this
includes all the method names of P ). Each extra register contains a specified value in
the initial state of AP and is never overwritten. The rest of the registers in the initial
state are empty. We write PatP for the set of patterns of property variables appearing
in P .
We next consider how labels are translated. The first two forms of label (call and
ret) describe observable events and are translated into one-letter transitions in AP ,
while the latter form is translated into two-letter transitions. Let {1, . . . , N} be the
set of registers of AP . We define three functions: reg : PatP → (N ∪ {⊥}) asso-
ciates a register to each pattern (with reg(*) = ⊥), while grd : PatP × N → G and
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(a) Property 2
start
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cd
error
I := S.iterator()
∗
∗
S := make(s, ∗)
S := make(∗, s)J := s.iterator()
i.set(∗)j.s
et(
∗)
j.n
ext
()i.next()
(b) Property 3
start
a b
error
X := input()
∗
(!sanitize)(∗)
X := make(x, ∗)
X := make(∗, x)
sanitize(x)
sink(x)
(c) Property 4
Fig. 3. TOPL formalisations of the example properties from Section 2.
act : PatP × N → A give respectively the guard and action correspoding to each
pattern and register. We set:
grd(x, j) =


true if x = V
eq reg(v) j if x = v
neq reg(v) j if x = !v
eq reg(x) j if x ∈ V
true if x = *
act(x, j) =


set reg(v) := j if x = V
nop if x = v
nop if x = !v
nop if x ∈ V
nop if x = *
We can now interpret labels of P into labels of AP . For each a label l of P , we define
its translation [[l]] = [([[l]]G, [[l]]A)], where [[−]]G and [[−]]A are given as follows.
[[l]]G =
{
grd(m, 1) and grd(x1, 3) and . . . and grd(xk, k+2) if l = call m(x1, . . . , xk)
pred(m, 1) and eq reg(x) 2 if l = ret x := m
[[l]]A =
{
act(x1, 3) and . . . and act(xk, k+2) if l = call m(x1, . . . , xk)
act(x, 2) if l = ret x := m
Finally, for the label x := m(x1, . . . , xk), observe its right-hand-side refers to a call,
while its left-hand-side refers to a return. We take this label to mean that m is called
with parameters matching x1, . . . , xk and returns a value matching x, and no event is
observed in the meantime. This is because an intermediate call, for instance a recursive
call, could disconnect the method call and the return value. Thus, this label translates
into a transition of length two:
[[x := m(x1, . . . , xk)]] = [[call m(x1, . . . , xk)]] [[ret x := m]]
Examples. Figure 3 displays the formal versions of the first three properties that are
discussed in Section 2.
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(a) This example illustrates how multiple related objects are tracked. In state two,
the property tracks all pairs of two iterators x and y for the same collection c. If
x.remove() is called, then state yBad becomes active, which precludes further use of
y’s methods. State xBad is symmetric.
(b) This example illustrates how chaining of values is tracked, while at the same
time tracking multiple related objects. Recall that Property (3) refers to the code in
Figure 2 (on page 4). In state a, the iterator i refers to the string s or some substring
of s. In state b, the itrerator j refers to s. As opposed to the previous property, the two
iterators i and j are not necessarily for the same collection, but rather for a collection
and one of its sub-collections. This property does not refer to the Java standard library,
which does not implement ropes. There exist, however, several independent libraries
that follow the pattern in Figure 2 (e.g. http://ahmadsoft.org/ropes/).
(c) This example illustrates sanitization of values, in addition to chaining. In state a,
the property keeps track of the tainted object x. An object is tainted if it comes from
a specific input method or was made from tainted objects, and was not sanitized. A
tainted object must not be sent to a sink.
Of course, the input of the TOPL compiler is not in graphical form. Below we
include the actual representation for a property of type (c) without the sanitization op-
tion. It specifies actual methods that provide tainted inputs, make tainted objects out
of tainted objects, and constitute sinks.4 We refer the reader to [18] for more example
properties.
property Taint
prefix <javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest>
prefix <java.lang.String>
prefix <java.sql.Statement>
start -> start: *
start -> tracking: X := *.getParameter[*]
tracking -> tracking: *
tracking -> tracking: X := x.concat(*)
tracking -> tracking: X := *.concat(x)
tracking -> error: *.executeQuery(x)
5 Implementation and Experiments
The TOPL tool5 checks at runtime whether Java programs violate TOPL properties. It
consists of a compiler and a monitor (see Figure 4, left).
Given the bytecode of a Java project and several TOPL properties, the compiler
produces instrumented bytecode and a hl-TOPL automaton. An instrumented method
emits a call event, runs the original bytecode, and then emits a return event. Emitting
an event is encoded by a call to the method check(Event) of the monitor. The Event
structure contains an integer identifier and an array of Objects. The identifier is unique
4 Note that, to ease the task of writing TOPL properties, we have included a prefix directive:
prefix p produces from every method name m, an extra name pm; it further produces, from
any transition involving m, a similar transition involving pm.
5 http://rgrig.github.com/topl
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Bytecode
Instrumenter
Automaton
Generator
TOPL Compiler
original
bytecode
TOPL
properties
hl-TOPL
automaton
instrumented
bytecode
TOPL
Monitor
JVM
Number of tracked active configurations
reference ≤ 0 ≤ 101 ≤ 102
tomcat 5.3±0.1 5.4±0.1 5.6±0.2 9.0±0.3
pmd 5.2±0.4 5.4±0.2 12.2±0.3 47.7±10.7
h2 6.6±0.2 9.5±0.2 130.1±12.2 timeout
Fig. 4. Left: Architecture of the TOPL tool. Right: Experimental Results. Times are in seconds,
averaged over 10 runs (not in convergence mode).
for each site from which the method check is called. The compiler achieves two tasks
that are interdependent: instrumenting the bytecode, and translating properties into an
automaton. The instrumentation could be done on all methods of the Java project, but
this would lead to high runtime overhead. Instead, the compiler instruments only the
methods that are mentioned by the TOPL properties to be checked. Conversely, the
translation of properties into automata depends on the Java project’s code. To see why,
consider a transition guarded in a property by the method name patternm. The compiler
instruments all the methods whose (fully qualified) names match the pattern m, and all
the methods that override methods whose names match the pattern m, thus taking into
account inheritance. All these instrumented methods emit events with identifiers from
a certain set of integers, which depends on the inheritance structure of the Java project.
The method name patternm is essentially compiled into a set of integer event identifiers.
The monitor is an interpreter for the hl-TOPL automaton that the compiler produces.
Its implementation closely follows the semantics from Section 3. For example, the mon-
itor maintains a set of active configurations, which are those reachable by a path labeled
by the events seen so far. There are, however, several differences. First, the number of
active configurations is not bounded in theory, but a bound may be enforced in prac-
tice. Monitoring becomes slower as the number of active configurations increases. As
a pragmatic compromise, the user may impose an upper bound, thus trading soundness
for efficiency. That is, if the user imposes a bound then monitoring is faster, but property
violations may be missed (on the other hand, a reported violation of a property is always
a real violation). Second, the implementation includes several optimizations. For exam-
ple, the guards produced by method name patterns, which require the current event id
to be from a certain set of integers, is implemented as a hashtable lookup rather than as
a linear search, as the formal semantics would suggest. Third, the implementation saves
extra information in order to provide friendlier error messages. For instance, the user
may ask the TOPL monitor to save and report the path taken in the configuration graph,
or full call stack traces for each event.
Experimental Results. We measured the overhead on the test suite DaCapo [13], ver-
sion 9.12. DaCapo is a collection of automated tests that exercise large portions of code
from open-source projects and the Java standard libraries. DaCapo itself has been used
for many experiments by the research community. Hence, we did not expect to find any
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bugs, but aimed instead at measuring the overhead. We checked two types of properties
with TOPL. First, properties that express correct usage of the standard Java libraries.
Second, properties that express temporal constraints which we extracted from the code
comments of three open-source projects (H2, PMD, Tomcat) included in DaCapo. H2 is
a database server for which we checked properties on the calling order of some interface
methods. For example, a client should not attempt to ask for a row from a cursor un-
less the latter has been previously advanced. PMD looks for bugs, dead code and other
problems in Java code. One of the five properties we checked is “Only if a scope replies
that it knows a name, it can be asked for that name’s definition”. Tomcat is a highly
concurrent servlet server. Servlets are Java programs running in a webserver, extracting
data from ServletRequests and sending data to ServletResponses. A response has
two associated incoming channels: a stream and a writer. They should not be both used
concurrently. But the servlet, before forwarding the response, must call flush on the
stream, on the writer, or on the response itself. This is one of the properties we checked.
Interestingly, while experimenting with Tomcat, TOPL discovered a concurrency bug
(a data race) in the DaCapo’s infrastructure which would manifest sometimes as null
dereference.
Although our tool is not currently optimised, we measured both time and space over-
head. It turns out that space overhead is negligible, below the variance caused by the
randomness of garbage collection. Thus, we only report on time overhead, in Figure 4
and Table 1. The relative overhead is meaningful only if the reference runtime is not
close to 0, and this is most distinctively the case for test eclipse whose runtime is over
10 s. The (geometric) average overhead in that case is ×1.5 with ≤ 3 active configura-
tions, and ×1.6 with ≤ 10 active configurations. Figure 4 shows the effect of tuning
the active configurations in terms of overhead. All experiments were performed on an
Intel i5 with 4 cores at 3.33GHz with 4GiB of memory, running Linux 2.6.32 and Java
VM 1.6.0 20.
6 Related work.
JavaMOP [23] and Tracematches [2] are based on slicing: A slice is a projection of
a word over a finite alphabet; different slices are fed, independently, to machines that
handle finite alphabets. Tracematches use regular expressions to specify recognisers
over finite alphabets. JavaMOP supports several other logics, via a plugin mechanism,
and slices are assigned categories, which can be match/fail or taken from some other
set. Because slices are analyzed independently, it not possible to express examples such
as (1) and (4), which use an unbounded number of register assignments.
Quantified Event Automata (QEA) [6] extend the slicing mechanism of JavaMOP
with the goal of improving expressivity. Similarly to TOPL automata, QEAs have guards
and assignments, which can be arbitrary predicates and transformations of the memory
content respectively. In contrast, our automata impose specific restrictions, which fol-
low the expressive power of RAs. In addition, QEAs introduce quantifiers, which can
be seen as a way to impose a hierarchy on slices. Systems based on machines with
parametric transition rules, such as RuleR [9], LogScope [7] and TraceContract [8], are
related to QEAs and are also very similar in spirit to the TOPL approach. RuleR is tuned
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original HasNext UnsafeIterator UnsafeMapIterator UnsafeFileWriter
st=3 st=10 st=3 st=10 st=3 st=10 st=3 st=10
avrora 8.1 27.8 60.5 163.3 323.1 194.5 179.9 8.3 5.9
batik 1.2 18.1 3.0 3.8 3.8 3.1 3.3 1.3 1.2
eclipse 17.4 24.2 24.0 30.9 41.7 27.2 28.0 22.9 22.8
fop 0.3 0.9 1.9 3.5 3.6 2.7 2.7 0.3 0.3
h2 6.2 5.9 6.8 8.3 20.0 13.5 11.2 6.4 6.0
jython 1.9 19.8 46.1 81.5 83.0 62.8 62.7 1.9 1.8
luindex 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9
lusearch 1.5 1.5 1.5 15.0 16.0 13.8 12.8 1.5 1.7
pmd 3.1 19.9 42.6 93.5 240.3 102.6 105.6 3.2 3.3
sunflow 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.3
tomcat 2.5 4.2 8.3 22.9 50.9 30.0 31.0 2.6 2.7
xalan 1.5 14.5 7.1 425.0 360.9 272.0 276.5 1.5 1.2
Table 1. Experiment on small properties (taken from [25]) run on the DaCapo benchmarks (in
convergence mode). HasNext checks that no iterator is advanced without first enquiring hasNext.
UnsafeIterator checks that no iterator is advanced after the iterated collection has been modified.
UnsafeMapIterator checks that no iterator on keys/values of a map is advanced after the map
has been updated. UnsafeFileWriter checks that no file is written to after it was closed. Column
original gives the running times (in seconds) for projects without instrumentation of Java stan-
dard libraries. The other columns report instrumented runs, with a maximum of 3 and 10 active
configurations.
towards high expressivity and in particular can handle context-free grammars with pa-
rameters, which go beyond the reach of TOPL. By comparison, TOPL automata seem a
simpler formalism, and this paper demonstrates how they are closely related to standard
automata-theoretical models.
QVM [3] is a runtime monitoring approach tailored to deployed systems. It achieves
high efficiency by being carefully implemented inside a Java virtual machine, checking
properties involving a single object, and being able to tune its overhead on-the-fly. On
the other hand, TOPL is designed for aiding the programmer during development and
testing, and therefore focusses instead on providing a precise and expressive language
for specifying temporal properties. For instance, TOPL can express properties involv-
ing many objects. Both QVM and TOPL let the programmer tune the overhead/coverage
balance. ConSpec [1] is a language used to describe security policies. Although Con-
Spec automata have a countable number of states, they are deterministic and therefore
cannot express the full range of TOPL properties.
From the techniques used mostly for static verification of object-oriented programs,
typestates [28] are probably the most similar to TOPL. A modular static verification
method for typestate protocols is introduced in [11]. The specification method is based
on linear logic, and relations among objects in the protocol are checked by a tailored
system of permissions. Similarly, [15,10] provide a means to specify typestate proper-
ties that belong to a single object. The specified properties are reminiscent of contracts
or method pre/post-conditions and can deal with inheritance. In [17] the authors present
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sound verification techniques for typestate properties of Java programs, which we envis-
age that can be fruitfully combined with the TOPL paradigm. Their approach is divided
into several stages each employing its own verifier, with progressively higher costs and
precisions. Every stage focuses on verifying only the parts of the code that previous
stages failed to verify.
A specification language for interface checking aimed at C programs, called SLIC,
is introduced in [5]. SLIC uses non-determinism to encode universal quantification of
dynamically allocated data and allows for complex code in the automaton transitions;
while TOPL specifications naturally express universally quantified properties over data
structures and, for effectiveness reasons, there is a limit on the actions performed dur-
ing automaton transitions. Simple SLIC specifications are verified by the SLAM veri-
fier [4].
Similar investigations have been pursued by the functional programming commu-
nity. In [16] contracts are used for expressing legal traces of programs in a functional
language with references. The contracts specify traces as regular expressions over calls
and returns, thus resembling our automata, albeit in quite a different setting. The speci-
fications are function-centered and, again, capturing inter-object relations seems some-
what tricky.
Finally, as demonstrated in previous sections, TOPL automata are a variant of reg-
ister automata [21,24], themselves a thread in an extensive body of work on automata
over infinite alphabets (see e.g. [27]). RAs form one of the most well-studied paradigms
in the field, with numerous extensions and variations (e.g. [14,12,27]).
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A Proofs
TOPL automata are are a superclass of register automata. It is relatively harder to es-
tablish that TOPL automata are at most as expressive as register automata. There are
three main ingredients in the proof. First, tuples (v1, . . . , vn) are unpacked into words
v1 . . . vn; correspondingly, transitions q → q′ become paths q → q1 → · · · → qn−1 →
q′. Second, register i is simulated by register r(i), where r ∈ [m] → [m] is encoded in
the state, such that values are not repeated in registers, as required by register automata.
Third, locally fresh values are written to an extra register, because register automata
never ignore such values.
On its own, the second ingredient is the same as the proof of Kaminski and Francez [21]
that their M-automata are equally expressive to register automata. In the proof below,
however, the first two ingredients (unpacking tuples and ensuring that values do not
repeat) are blended together to improve the bounds. The encoding of the function r
leads to a mm expansion, in the worst case. It turns out that a similar function is needed
for unpacking tuples, which would lead to another similar expansion if the first two
ingredients would not be mixed.
Consider the label (eq 1 2, set1 := 1), with the alphabet V 2. When tuples are un-
packed, it would be tempting to replace it by the two labels, (true, set 1) and (eq 1, nop),
one for each component of the tuple. But, this would be incorrect, as the second com-
ponent should be compared to the old value of register 1. The solution is to add extra
registers and a function similar to r that keeps track of which register simulates which
register.
Proposition 5 (TOPL to RA) There exists an algorithm that, given a low-level TOPL
automaton A, builds a register automaton A′ such that L(A′) = f(L(A)), where
f
(
(v1, . . . , vn)
)
= v1 . . . vn extends to languages as follows
f(L(A)) = { f(v1) . . . f(vk) | v1 . . . vk ∈ L(A) }
If A has m registers, |δ| transitions, |Q| states, and works over n-tuples, then A′ has
2m+ 1 registers, |δ′| = O(n(2m)2m|δ|) transitions, and O((2m)m|Q|+ |δ′|) states.
Proof. Each state q of A is encoded by (2m)m states (q, r) of A′, one for each r ∈
[m] → [2m]. While in a state (q, r), register r(i) of A′ simulates register i of A. Each
transition (q, (g, a), q′) in A is encoded by paths
(q0, r0)
(g1,a1)
−−−−→ (q1, r1)
(g2,a2)
−−−−→ · · ·
(gn,an)
−−−−−→ (qn, rn)
with q0 = q and qn = q′. For each r0 there are at most (2m+ 1)n such paths, because
each (qj , rj) has at most 2m+ 1 successors, as described below.
The following invariants are maintained along the path. The values held by regis-
ters r0([m]) are not changed – they simulate the values that A holds in state q. The
guards gj use only the current letter and the registers r0([m]). The values held by reg-
isters rn([m]) in state (qn, rn) are the values that A holds in state q′. In intermediate
states (qj , rj), the registers rj([m]) hold a mixture of the values held by r0([m]) and
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those held by rn([m]) in state (qn, rn). A more precise description of the mixture fol-
lows: Let the action a(≤j) be obtained from the original action a by filtering out assign-
ments (set i′ := j′) with j < j′. Then registers rj([m]) in state (qj , rj) simulate what
the registers of A would be in state q′ if a would be replaced by a(≤j).
The invariants mentioned in the previous paragraph are maintained by constructing
the guards gj and the actions aj as follows.
Let Ig be the set { i | eq i j occurs in g } of registers that must equal the current
component j; similarly, let I ′g = { i | neq i j occurs in g }. If |r0(Ig)| ≥ 2 or |r0(Ig) ∩
r0(I
′
g)| ≥ 1, then (qj−1, rj−1) has no successor. If r0(Ig) = {i}, then (qj−1, rj−1)
has exactly one successor, and the guard gj is eq i. If r0(Ig) = ∅, then (qj−1, rj−1)
has |[2m] − r0(I ′g)| + 1 successors with the guards fresh and, respectively, eq i for
i ∈ [2m]− r0(I
′
g).
The action aj and the function rj are computed from the original action a, the previ-
ous function rj−1, and from the guard gj , which is described in the previous paragraph.
Let Ia = { i | a writes component j to register i }. First a target register in A′ is picked,
and then the saving of component j in registers Ia is simulated. The target k ∈ [2m],
which is needed only if Ia 6= ∅, is picked as follows:
k =
{
i if gj is eq i
min
(
[2m]− r0([m])− rj−1([m]− Ia)
)
if gj is fresh
The action aj depends on gj and on Ia.
aj =
{
nop if gj is eq i, or Ia = ∅
set k if gj is fresh, and Ia 6= ∅
Finally, the repartition function is updated to reflect that registers Ia are now simulated
by k.
rj(i) =
{
k if i ∈ Ia
rj−1(i) if i /∈ Ia
At this point the labels have the form (eq i, nop) or (fresh, set i) or (fresh, nop).
Only the latter is disallowed by the definition of register automata. It can be handled
by adding one register, without significantly increasing the number of transitions. First,
each label (fresh, nop) is transformed into (fresh, set 2m+ 1). Second, for each transi-
tion labeled (fresh, a), we add a parallel transition labeled (eq 2m+ 1, a). ⊓⊔
Proposition 10 (TOPL to hl-TOPL) There exists an algorithm that, given a low-level
TOPL automaton A with |Q| states, at most d transitions outgoing of each state, and
guards with at most k conjuncts, builds a high-level TOPL automaton A′ with |Q|+ 1
states and at most (d+ kd)|Q| transitions such that Lρ(A′) = L(A).
Proof. For the automaton A compare the low-level configuration graph with the high-
level configuration graph. Each low-level transition x1 →ℓ x2 corresponds to several
high-level standard transitions (x1, ℓw) →֒ℓ (x2, w), for all w. The high-level graph,
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however, also has skip transitions (x, ℓw) →֒ℓ (x,w) for configurations x that have no
outgoing standard transitions. Thus, the low-level language and the high-level language
would agree if all low-level configurations would have at least one outgoing transition.
We obtain A′ from A by adding unit transitions that do not change the low-level
language, but ensure that all low-level configurations have an outgoing transition. First
we add a special stuck state qstuck. Then, for each original state q, we list the guards
g1, g2, . . . , gd of the outgoing transitions. The configuration (q, s) has no outgoing
transition for some ℓ when (s, ℓ) 6|= gi for i ∈ [k]. So, we synthesize a guard g that
holds exactly in this situation. Informally, we want to add a transition from q to qstuck
with the guard g = ¬g1 ∧ . . .∧¬gd and the action nop. Such a guard is not expressible
in the TOPL guard logic. However, we can negate the simple guards eq and neq, we can
use distributivity to put g in disjunctive normal form, and we can simulate disjunction
by parallel transitions. Thus, if each gi contains up to k simple conjuncts, we add at
most kd transitions from state q. ⊓⊔
Proposition 11 (hl-TOPL to TOPL) There exists an algorithm that, given a high-level
TOPL automaton Aρ, builds a low-level TOPL automaton A such that Lρ(Aρ) =
L(A).
If Aρ is over the alphabet V nρ with mρ registers, |Qρ| states, and |δρ| transitions
of length ≤ d, then A is over the alphabet Vρ with m = mρ + (d − 1)n registers,
O(d2(m+ 1)m|Qρ|) states, and O(d2(m+ 1)(m+n)|δρ|) transitions.
Proof. The set of states of A is
Q = Qρ × {0, . . . , d− 1} × {0, . . . , d− 1} ×
(
[m] ⇀ [m]
)
When the high-level configuration(
qρ, (v1, . . . , vmρ)
)
, ℓ0 . . . ℓh−1
of Aρ is reached, one of the low-level configurations
(qρ, h, k, r), (u1, . . . , um)
of A is reached. Here h is the length of the remembered history, while k, r, u1, . . . , um
vary subject to the following constraining invariants:
– the stores of A are injective: ui 6= uj if i 6= j
– for i ∈ [mρ], the value of register i of Aρ is stored in register r(i) of A; that is,
ur(i) = vi
– for 0 ≤ k′ < h and ℓk′ = (v′1, . . . , v′n) and 1 ≤ i′ ≤ n, the i′th component v′i′
of letter ℓk′ is stored in register r(ι(k + k′, i′)) of A, where ι(k′′, i′) = mρ +
(k′′ mod d)n+ i′; that is,
ur(ι(k+k′,i′)) = v
′
i′
– r is undefined for register slots that are reserved for storing letters but are currently
unused; namely, r(ι(k + k′, i′)) is undefined for all i′ and k′ such that 1 ≤ i′ ≤ n
and h ≤ k′ < d
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We consider in turn each state q = (qρ, h, k, r). Its outgoing transitions are deter-
mined by the outgoing transitions of qρ.
We must cater for two situations: Either more letters are arriving and we should
simulate storing them in the queue and possibly make a state transition, or no more
letters are arriving and we should simulate emptying the queue to see if we end up in
an accepting state.
Crucially, enough information is available to statically simulate receiving all the
letters in the queue. To see this, consider a transition in Aρ out of qρ,
(qρ, [(g0, a0), . . . , (gd′−1, ad′−1)], q
′
ρ) with d′ ≤ h
We can assume d′ ≤ h as only transitions short enough to be evaluated with the received
letters may be taken.
Consider an assignment (set i := j) that appears in ak′ . Suppose that the distribu-
tion of values just before this assignment is given by r′. This means that the register i
of Aρ is simulated by r′(i), and that the jth component of letter ℓk′ is simulated by
r′(ι(k + k′, j)). After the assignment is executed, the distribution of values is given by
r′′(i′) =
{
r′(ι(k + k′, j)) if i′ = i
r′(i′) otherwise
Thus, it is possible to statically find the register distribution function after each of the
d′ steps.
Let us write rk′ for the distribution function just before step k′; in particular, r0 = r,
where r is given by the state q of A. Suppose now that gk′ contains the conjunct (eq i j).
We can evaluate this conjunct statically by checking whether rk′(i) = rk′ (ι(k+ k′, j)).
Similarly, we can evaluate (neq i j) by checking whether rk′(i) 6= rk′(ι(k + k′, j)) as
the store is injective. Thus we can evaluate all guards g0, g1, . . . , gd′−1.
If one of the guards is not true, we know that the transition would not be taken, if
the queue were to be emptied. If all guards are true, we know that the resulting state
is (q′ρ, h − d′, (k + d′) mod d, rd′). If h − d′ > 0 then we carry on simulating. If
h− d′ = 0 then we note if q′ρ is final in Aρ.
If we find that no transitions are taken, then we must compute the result of a skip
transition. This can also be done statically by incrementing k, decrementing h and re-
placing the distribution function by one that is undefined at ι(k, i′) for i′ ∈ [n]. If
k − 1 > 0, we carry on simulating and if k − 1 = 0, we note if qρ is final in Aρ.
If any of these simulations thus notices a final state, then (qρ, h, k, r) is final in A.
Now to handle the case of more incoming letters, we need to add transtions. We
treat three cases: Firstly, if the queue is not full (h < d − 1) then we simply store
the current letter in the queue. Secondly, if the queue is full (h = d − 1) and none of
the transitions in Aρ out of qρ has maximal length (length d), then we can statically
determine if we need to simulate a high-level standard transition or a skip transition and
what the resulting states would be. Thirdly, if the queue is full, and there is a transition
of maximal length, then we need to dynamically look at the current letter to determine
if that transition is taken and where it leads. Note that this also determines whether a
skip transition should be simulated.
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Case h < d− 1. In this case all outgoing transitions of q simply record the current
letter ℓ = (v1, . . . , vn). To maintain the injectivity of stores, only those components
of ℓ that are not already in some register must be stored. We consider (m+1)n distinct
situations: each of the n components may be in one of the m registers, or it may be fresh.
Such a situation is described by a function p ∈ [n] ⇀ [m]. We add to A a transition
(qρ, h, k, r), (gp, ap), (qρ, h+ 1, k, rp)
The guard gp is constructed such that it ensures we are indeed in a situation described
by p; the action ap stores the fresh values of ℓ somewhere outside of r([m]); the func-
tion rp records where the fresh values were stored and where the existing values already
were.
The guard gp is constructed as follows. If p(j) is undefined, which means that vj
should be fresh, then gp contains conjuncts (neq i j) for i ∈ [m]. If p(j) is defined,
which means that up(j) = vj , then gp contains the conjunct (eq p(j) j). These are all
the conjuncts of gp.
We now fix some injection σ from the set {vj | p(j) undefined} of fresh values
to the set [m] − r([m]) of unused registers. The action ap contains an assignment
(setσ(vj) := j) for each j where p(j) is undefined. Also
rp(ι(k
′, i′)) =


p(i′) if k′ = k + h and p(i′) defined
σ(vi′ ) if k′ = k + h and p(i′) undefined
r(ι(k′, i′)) otherwise
Case h = d− 1, no outgoing transitions of length d. At this point the values in the
m registers of A are enough to decide whether to simulate a standard or a skip tran-
sition of Aρ. The construction above is used to add transitions which save the current
letter. However, each such transition is added a number of times, one for each outgoing
transition in Aρ. The targets of these transitions are modified to reflect the effect of
taking the transition. This can be determined statically as described above. Specifically,
it is known at this point if any of the transitions can be taken. We only add the ones
that would (we cannot determine a target for the others anyway). If no transitions can
be taken, we simulate a standard transition. This is again done by storing the current
letter, but we also drop the letter at the front of the queue (by incrementing k and decre-
menting h and replacing the distribution function by one that is undefined at ι(k, i′) for
i′ ∈ [n]).
Case h = d− 1, Aρ has an outgoing transition of length d. At this point the values
in the m registers of A together with the current letter are needed to decide whether to
simulate a standard or a skip transition of Aρ.
As in the case above, we can statically evaluate all transitions of length shorter than
d and add transitions for them. But we cannot add the encoding of a skip transition be-
cause it should only be taken if no standard transitions are. For each standard transition
of length d
(qρ, [(g0, a0), . . . , (gd−1, ad−1)], q
′
ρ),
we can statically evaluate up to the point right before the final guard gd−1. Thus we can
add an automata transition to A with (g′d−1, a′d−1) on it and target (q′ρ, 0, 0, r′), where
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g′d−1 and a′d−1 are versions of gd−1 and ad−1 modified to refer to rd−1 and r′ is a
version of rd which is undefined on all indices pointing into the queue.
The guard g′d′−1 is constructed as follows: For all conjuncts eq i j in gd′−1, g′d′−1
contains eq rd′−1(i) j and for all conjuncts neq i j in gd′−1, g′d′−1 contains neq rd′−1(i) j.
Finally, we must also simulate a skip transition, but only to be taken in case none
of the other transitions are. That is, if any of the short transitions are taken, we have no
skip transition. If none of the short transitions are taken, we construct a guard that is
true if none of the final guards for the maximal length transitions are. Guards to ensure
this are generated using the same construction employed in the proof of Proposition 10.
These are then combined with the construction in the previous case. ⊓⊔
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